

Implicit Bias and Philosophy

VOLUME 1

Metaphysics and Epistemology

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Contents

<i>Contributors</i>	vii
<i>Contents of Volume 2</i>	ix
Introduction <i>Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul</i>	1
Part 1. The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, and Stereotype Threat	
1.1 Playing Double: Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-Control <i>Keith Frankish</i>	23
1.2 Implicit Bias, Reinforcement Learning, and Scaffolded Moral Cognition <i>Bryce Huebner</i>	47
1.3 The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias <i>Jules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman</i>	80
1.4 De-Freuding Implicit Attitudes <i>Edouard Machery</i>	104
1.5 Stereotype Threat and Persons <i>Ron Mallon</i>	130
Part 2. Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality	
2.1 Bias: Friend or Foe? Reflections on Saulish Skepticism <i>Louise M. Antony</i>	157
2.2 Virtue, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias <i>Alex Madva</i>	191
2.3 Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality <i>Stacey Goguen</i>	216
2.4 The Status Quo Fallacy: Implicit Bias and Fallacies of Argumentation <i>Catherine E. Hundleby</i>	238

2.5 Revisiting Current Causes of Women's Underrepresentation in Science <i>Carole J. Lee</i>	265
2.6 Philosophers Explicitly Associate Philosophy with Maleness: An Examination of Implicit and Explicit Gender Stereotypes in Philosophy <i>Laura Di Bella, Eleanor Miles, and Jennifer Saul</i>	283
<i>Index of Names</i>	309
<i>Index of Subjects</i>	313