

Contents

I. Introduction: Analysis and Language	1
§ 1 What holds the analytical dialogue together—tenets, methods, or problems?	1
§ 2 Semantic ascent and semantic descent	12
§ 3 The replacement of disagreements about method by disagreements about substance	26
§ 4 Thought, meaning, and verification	35
§ 5 Naturalized epistemology versus normative epistemology	41
II. Analysis and Reasoning	49
§ 6 Analysis as reasoning about reasoning	49
§ 7 Differences between categorical and hypothetical, and between deductive and inductive, modes of philosophical reasoning	63
§ 8 The role of intuitions	73
§ 9 The dominance of singular intuitions over general ones	82
§ 10 Philosophy as a form of transition from belief to acceptance	91
§ 11 When may an intuition be disregarded?	97
§ 12 Why do analytical philosophers disagree?	107
§ 13 Is philosophy of science an empirical enquiry?	118
§ 14 Deductivism and inductivism as alternative strategies in analytical philosophy	129
III. Analysis and Rationality	149
§ 15 Are people programmed to commit deductive fallacies?	149
§ 16 Are people programmed to commit fallacies in probabilistic reasoning?	157
§ 17 The dominance of counterfactualizable probabilities over non-counterfactualizable ones	165

§ 18	The foundations of counterfactualizable probability	113
§ 19	Rationality vindicated	183
 IV. Analysis and Computation		 193
§ 20	Computerization as an analytical technique	193
§ 21	Simulated parroting and simulated understanding	205
§ 22	Information-processing arguments for a language of thought	211
§ 23	Realism versus anti-realism in the computational analogy	220
§ 24	Should tokens of Mentalese be supposed to occur in the neuronal hardware?	226
 Index		 233