

Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	<i>page</i> ix
<i>List of tables</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
Introduction	1
Part I Modeling parliamentary debate	15
1 A theory of parliamentary debate	17
1.1 Democracy and debate	18
1.2 The nature of parliamentary speech	20
1.3 Parties, rebels, and speech – a theory	24
1.4 Two illustrations	28
1.5 A delegation model of parliamentary speech	34
1.6 Summary	41
2 Empirical implications	43
2.1 Country-level variables – electoral systems	44
2.2 Within-country variables – electoral tiers and candidate selection	49
2.3 Effects of electoral incentives on debate participation	52
2.4 Summary	55
3 Research design	56
3.1 Empirical strategy: an overview	56
3.2 Cross-national comparison and party survey	58
3.3 Case selection: Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and New Zealand	61
3.4 Measurement of latent concepts	70
3.5 Summary	72
Part II Empirical studies of parliamentary debate	75
4 Debates and institutions	77
4.1 Parliamentary rules	78

4.2	Party rules	83
4.3	Summary	99
5	Debate participation: Germany and the United Kingdom	100
5.1	Hypotheses	100
5.2	MP status: when party leaders get involved	101
5.3	Ideological disagreement	115
5.4	Summary	123
6	Dissent in parliament and the media: Germany and the United Kingdom	124
6.1	Political reaction to the financial crisis, 2008–2009	125
6.2	Fiscal stimulus debates in the United Kingdom	129
6.3	Fiscal stimulus debates in Germany	136
6.4	Summary	147
7	Candidate selection and debate participation: a European perspective	148
7.1	Party debate rules in the European Parliament	149
7.2	Votes, rebels, and speaking time	152
7.3	Summary	161
8	Changing institutions: New Zealand	163
8.1	Electoral system change	163
8.2	Rules change in parliament	164
8.3	Behavioral change: budget debate participation	166
8.4	Summary	173
	Conclusion	174
	<i>Appendix</i>	181
	<i>Bibliography</i>	186
	<i>Index</i>	199