

Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions

Hanno Sauer

**The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England**

Contents

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction 1

- 1 The Fork 1
- 2 What's Reason Got to Do with It? 2
- 3 Two Challenges 3
- 4 Feeling and Thinking: A (Very) Brief History of Recent Moral Psychology 6
- 5 Educated Intuitions: An Overview 11
- 6 What Is This Thing Called Morality? 16

I The Anti-Rationalist Challenge 21

1 The Effectiveness of Moral Reasoning 25

- Introduction 25
- 1 The Effectiveness Thesis 26
- 2 The Conscious-Reasoning Paradigm 28
- 3 Running Out of Reasons 29
- 4 The *No Reasons* Interpretation 32
- 5 Moral Reasoning as Confabulation 34
- 6 Moral Reasoning from an Intuitionist Perspective 36
- 7 Placebic Reasons 39
- 8 Moral Principles: Universal Moral Grammar or Confabulation? 41
- 9 Moral Choice Blindness 43
- 10 The Social Structure of Moral Reasoning 45
- 11 The Causality Requirement 47
- Conclusion 48

2 Educated Intuitions 51

Introduction 51

- 1 The Automaticity Challenge 53
- 2 Habits and Practical Reason 57
- 3 Intellectualism and the Reasons Theory 61
- 4 Reason, Habits, and Second Nature 63
- 5 From *Post Hoc* Reasoning to Confabulation 65
- 6 Rational Habits: The Goal-Dependency of Education 66
- 7 Varieties of *Post Hoc* Reasoning 67
- 8 Moral Education: Experience and Teaching 70
- 9 *Ex Ante* Education 74
- 10 *Ex Post* Education 76
- 11 Reason and Its Limits 82

Conclusion 83

3 Moral Reasoning as a Social Practice 85

Introduction 85

- 1 Moral Intuitions and the Structure of Moral Justification 87
- 2 Structural Contextualism 90
- 3 Moral Justification and Moral Education 94
- 4 Confabulation or Inarticulateness? 95
- 5 From Challenges to Responses 100
- 6 From Responses to Challenges 102
- 7 The Flexibility of the Space of Reasons 105
- 8 Giving and Asking for Reasons 107
- 9 Moral Justification from an Empirical Perspective 115

Conclusion 126

II The Emotionist Challenge 129**4 Moral Error 139**

Introduction 139

- 1 What Is Emotionism? 141
- 2 The Infallibility Problem 145
- 3 Recalcitrant and Flimsy Feelings 147
- 4 The Wrong Kind of Mistake 150
- 5 Substantive Moral Mistakes 160

Conclusion 163

5 Are Emotions Necessary for Moral Judgment? 165

Introduction 165

- 1 The Necessity Thesis: Psychopathy and the Moral/Conventional Distinction 168
- 2 Perceptual Characteristics of Emotions 173
- 3 Morality and Emotion: The Limits of Empathy 181
- 4 Is Reason Necessary for Moral Judgment? 185

Conclusion 191

6 Are Emotions Sufficient for Moral Judgment? 193

Introduction 193

- 1 The Sufficiency Thesis: Morality and Disgust 194
- 2 Justificatory Sufficiency 197
- 3 Moral Judgment and Reasons Responsiveness 200
- 4 Conceptual Constraints 210
- 5 What Reflection Can (and Cannot) Do 212
- 6 A (Limited) Role for Disgust? 217

Conclusion 219

III Applying the Model 223**7 Educated Deontological Intuitions 227**

Introduction 227

- 1 Moral Dilemmas and Moral Intuitions 227
- 2 "From Neural 'Is' to Moral 'Ought'" 230
- 3 Functional Neuroimaging and the Problem of Reverse Inference 231
- 4 Response Time and Cognitive Load 234
- 5 Brain Lesions and the Dual Process Model 237
- 6 Up Close and Personal? From the Personal/Impersonal Distinction to the Concept of "Personal Force" 239
- 7 Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgment 245
- 8 Educated Deontological Intuitions 247

Conclusion 255

Conclusion 257

Notes 265

References 275

Name Index 305

Subject Index 309