

Contents

<i>Series Editor's Preface</i>	x
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xii
Introduction: The Situation of Phenomenology	1
1 What Is Phenomenology?	7
1.1 Phenomenologies	7
1.2 Historical background and foreground	10
1.3 Death and reincarnation	13
1.4 A different phenomenology	16
1.5 Further reading	17
2 Naturalism, Transcendentalism and a New Naturalizing	19
2.1 Mathematics and psychology	19
2.2 Naturalistic and transcendental accounts	22
2.3 The new naturalism	28
2.4 Some natural ways of using phenomenology	33
2.4.1 Formalizing phenomenology	33
2.4.2 Neurophenomenology	36
2.4.3 Front-loaded phenomenology	37
2.5 Further reading	40
3 Phenomenological Methods and Some Retooling	41
3.1 The natural attitude	41
3.2 The epoché	43
3.3 The phenomenological reduction	47
3.4 Retooling the eidetic reduction	49
3.5 Some questions about the first person perspective and language	56
3.6 Further reading	60

4	Intentionalities	62
4.1	Husserl's theory of intentionality	63
4.2	Noesis–noema	67
4.3	Enactive intentionality	72
4.4	Further reading	80
5	Embodiment and the Hyletic Dimension	82
5.1	Hyle: a sensational concept	82
5.2	The critique of Husserl's theory	86
5.3	Hyle and quale	89
5.4	Embodiment and hyletic experience	93
5.5	Deepening the enactive interpretation	96
5.6	Further reading	99
6	Time and Time Again	100
6.1	Experiencing time	100
6.2	Husserl's analysis	103
6.3	The ubiquity of temporality	107
6.4	One more time: primal impression and enactive structure	114
6.5	Further reading	121
7	Self and First-Person Perspective	122
7.1	A tradition of disagreements	122
7.2	Pre-reflective and minimal aspects of self	127
7.3	The sense of ownership	131
7.3.1	Schizophrenia	136
7.3.2	Somatoparaphrenia	140
7.3.3	Rubber hand illusion and whole body displacement	143
7.3.4	The NASA robot experience	146
7.4	First-person perspective	148
7.5	Further reading	157
8	Lifeworld, Action, Narrative	159
8.1	The lifeworld	159
8.2	Turning the tables	164
8.3	Action and agency	168

8.4	The narrative scale	172
8.5	Further reading	181
9	Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective	182
9.1	Transcendental intersubjectivity	182
9.2	Being-with others	187
9.3	Standard views of social cognition	191
9.4	Phenomenological approaches to social cognition	193
	9.4.1 Developmental studies	195
	9.4.2 Behavioral and phenomenological evidence	198
	9.4.3 Evidence from dynamic systems modeling	200
9.5	The narrative scale in social cognition	201
9.6	Revisiting transcendental intersubjectivity	202
9.7	Further reading	204
	<i>Notes</i>	205
	<i>References</i>	212
	<i>Index</i>	233