

Contents

Preface xi

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction: Minding Ostension xv

I.1 Philosophical Questions of Mind and Language xvi

I.2 Contemporary Resources xviii

I.3 Historical Resources xxi

I.4 Philosophical Investigations xxiii

I.5 Phenomenology xxiv

I.6 The Publicness of Language Logically Entails a Phenomenology of Ostension xxvii

I Contemporary Resources 1

1 The Philosophy of Action, Perception, and Play 3

1.1 The Relevance of Ostension 4

1.2 The Irrelevance of Inner Evidence 7

1.3 The Irrelevance of Communicative Intentions 8

1.4 The Need for a Phenomenological Approach to Action 9

1.5 A Sketch of the Phenomenological Account 16

2 The Science of Prelinguistic Joint Attention 21

2.1 Word Learning and Joint Attention 22

2.2 The Conceptual and Phenomenological Problem of Mind Reading 24

2.3 The Ontogeny and Phylogeny of Joint Attention 26

2.4 Mirror Neurons and Theory of Mind 28

2.5 Pragmatics, Gesture, and Accidental Information Transmission 30

2.6 Why Ostension Is Necessary 32

II	Historical Resources	39
3	Wittgenstein: Ostension Makes Language Public	41
3.1	Background: Wittgenstein's Method and Context	43
3.2	Ostension and the Unintelligibility of Private Languages	46
3.3	An Augustinian Emphasis on Ostension	49
3.4	An Alternative to Augustine: Disambiguating Ostension through Training	54
3.5	Ostension through Perception, Not Inference	57
3.6	Comparison with Russell	59
3.7	Ostension Cancels an Intersubjective Hiddenness	62
3.8	Conclusion	64
4	Merleau-Ponty: Gestural Meaning and the Living Body	67
4.1	Background: Merleau-Ponty's Method and Context	68
4.2	Merleau-Ponty's Account of Word Acquisition	70
4.3	The Elusive Nature of Gesturing	71
4.4	The Reciprocity of Gesturing and "Flesh"	73
4.5	Comparison with Heidegger	77
4.6	Flesh and Words	79
4.7	Conclusion	81
5	Augustine: Word Learning by Understanding the Movements of Life	85
5.1	Background: Augustine's Method and Context	87
5.2	The Problem of Conversation by Convention	89
5.3	Bodily Movement, Manifestation, and Word Acquisition	92
5.4	The Ambiguity of Ostension	95
5.5	Mental Language and Word Acquisition	98
5.6	An Animate Theory of Mind	100
5.7	Conclusion	104
6	Aristotle: Natural Movement and the Problem of Shared Understanding	107
6.1	Background: Aristotle's Method and Context	109
6.2	Sharing Intelligibility	111
6.3	The Problem of Shared Intelligibility	113
6.4	Sharing Attention through Bodily Movement	116
6.5	Comparison with Descartes	118
6.6	From Revelatory Movement to Collective Intentionality	123
6.7	The Ambiguity of Ostension and the Logic of Perception	125
6.8	Conclusion	127

III Philosophical Investigations	129
7 Phenomenology: Discovering Ostension	131
7.1 Manifestation	133
7.2 Inference Lacks the Appropriate Evidence	135
7.3 Answering Objections to the Manifestation Account	139
7.4 Replacing Inner and Outer with Joint Presence	143
7.5 How to Handle Appearances	146
8 Mind: The Logic of Ostension	151
8.1 A Different Kind of Analogy	153
8.2 Manifestation I: Animate Action Discloses Affects	156
8.3 Manifestation II: Mirroring Disclosure	161
8.4 Manifestation III: Reciprocal Roles of Disclosure	163
8.5 Other Animate Minds	166
9 Epistemology: Disambiguating Ostension	171
9.1 Disambiguating Ostensive Definitions	172
9.2 Disambiguating Ostension	176
9.3 The Nature of the Conversational Animal	179
9.4 Indeterminacy and the Publicness of Perception	182
9.5 Words, Identification, and Understanding	185
10 Metaphysics: Movement, Manifestation, and Language	193
10.1 Animate Movement and Joint Presence	194
10.2 Relating Mechanical and Phenomenological Movement	197
10.3 The Ostensive Animal	202
10.4 Words Are Ostensive	205
10.5 Manifestation Makes Language Public	208
10.6 Philosophy's Manifest Starting Point	211
11 Conclusion: The Origin of the Human Conversation	215
11.1 Behold the Animate Mind	216
11.2 New Wine in New Skins	218
11.3 A Glance Back	219
11.4 The Conversation about Conversation	220
Notes	223
Bibliography	269
Index	289