

CONTENTS

<i>Note on Sources and Abbreviations</i>	xiii
<i>Introduction</i>	i
1. AN OLD PROBLEM	7
1. Introduction	7
2. Allison's Deflationary Proposal	8
3. Reasons for Suspicion	10
4. A Metaphysical Proposal, and an Acid Test Passed	12
2. THREE KANTIAN THESES	15
1. Introduction	15
2. Bennett on Two Distinctions and their Conflation	24
3. A Case For, and Against, the 'Bare Substratum'	28
4. Three Theses: Some Further Texts	33
5. The Distinction	34
6. Humility	41
7. Receptivity	43
3. SUBSTANCE AND PHENOMENAL SUBSTANCE	48
1. Introduction	
2. The Pure Concept of Substance vs. the Schematized	48
3. The Concept of Phenomenal Substance in General	53
4. Matter as a Merely Comparative Subject	56
5. Note on the Inference to Substance	64
6. Concluding Remarks and New Business	66
4. LEIBNIZ AND KANT	68
1. Introduction	68
2. Kant's Version of Leibniz	70
3. A Distinction between Phenomena and Things in Themselves	74
4. A Reduction of Phenomena to Things in Themselves	78
5. Knowledge, via Phenomena, of Things in Themselves	89
6. Kant and Leibniz on Relations	93

5. KANT'S REJECTION OF REDUCIBILITY	97
1. An Early Distinction between Phenomena and Things in Themselves	97
2. The Principle of Succession, and Receptivity	104
3. The Principle of Coexistence, and Irreducibility	107
4. Analysis of the Argument for Irreducibility: Preliminaries	109
5. Irreducibility Argument I	112
6. Irreducibility Argument II	115
7. Concluding Remarks	121
6. FITTING THE PIECES TOGETHER	124
1. Assembly	124
2. An Imaginative Exercise	125
3. Kant, Leibniz, and a Mirror Broken	127
4. Later Signs of the Irreducibility Argument	131
7. A COMPARISON WITH LOCKE	140
1. A Phenomenalist Reading of the Comparison	140
2. Problems, and a Contradiction	142
3. A Different Lockean Distinction	147
4. A Contradiction Dissolved	155
5. A Closer Look	158
8. KANT'S 'PRIMARY' QUALITIES	162
1. Introduction	162
2. Bennett's Instructive Mistake	163
3. Spatial Features and Space-Filling Features	165
4. A Caveat about Space	166
5. Kant's 'Primary' Qualities: Geometrical and Dynamical	168
6. Solidity vs. Impenetrability, and a Problem for a Contemporary Orthodoxy	172
7. Science: Primary vs. Tertiary Qualities	177
8. Objectivity: Primary vs. Tertiary Qualities	182
9. THE UNOBSERVABLE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE	186
1. Experience and the Unobservable	186
2. The Kant-Eberhard Controversy: Unobservable vs. Supersensible	191
3. Observability and Community	195
4. Monadology, Well vs. Badly Understood	197
5. Final Comments	203

	<i>Contents</i>	xi
10.	REALISM OR IDEALISM?	205
1.	Summing Up	205
2.	Idealism: First Impressions	206
3.	Idealism: Things in Themselves	207
4.	Idealism: Space	210
	<i>Bibliography</i>	219
	<i>Index</i>	227