

Triangular Cases

**The Application of Bilateral Income Tax Treaties
in Multilateral Situations**

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Table of Contents

Abstract	v
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Acknowledgements	vii
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Part I Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction	3
1.1. Introduction	3
1.2. Background and outline of triangular cases	3
1.2.1. PE triangular cases	3
1.2.1.1. The residence state's obligation to provide relief	6
1.2.1.2. The PE state and the non-discrimination principle	6
1.2.1.3. Limitation of the source state's taxing rights	7
1.2.1.4. Underlying causes of the issues arising in PE triangular cases	8
1.2.1.5. Potential solutions	9
1.2.1.6. Extension of treaty benefits to PEs	10
1.2.2. Dual resident triangular cases	11
1.2.3. Reverse PE triangular cases	13
1.2.4. Reverse dual resident triangular cases	14
1.2.5. Variations on the basic triangular cases	16
1.3. Scope and assumptions	16
1.4. Conclusion	18

Part II PE Triangular Cases

Chapter 2: PE Triangular Cases and Specific Categories of Income	21
2.1. Introduction	21
2.2. Tax treatment in the absence of income tax treaties	22
2.3. Applicable tax treaties	23
2.4. Passive income	24
2.4.1. Dividends	25
2.4.2. Interest	29
2.4.3. Royalties	31
2.5. Business profits	33

Table of Contents

2.5.1.	Sub-PE triangular cases	36
2.5.2.	Business income arising from activities of artistes and sportsmen (article 17)	39
2.6.	Income from immovable property	40
2.6.1.	Income considered “business profits” under domestic law	42
2.6.1.1.	Whether the income will be business profits for treaty purposes	43
2.6.1.2.	Whether the income is “dealt with” in another article of the treaty	45
2.6.2.	Income not considered business profits	47
2.6.3.	Overview	48
2.6.4.	Policy considerations	49
2.7.	Income from shipping, inland waterways transport and air transport	50
2.8.	Capital gains	52
2.8.1.	Capital gains from the alienation of immovable property	52
2.8.2.	Capital gains from the alienation of movable property of a PE	55
2.8.3.	Capital gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft operated in international traffic	57
2.8.4.	Capital gains from the alienation of shares in a real estate company (and similar cases)	58
2.8.5.	Capital gains from the alienation of other property	61
2.9.	Other income	61
2.10.	Conclusions	63
Chapter 3: Double Taxation Relief in the Residence State		65
3.1.	Introduction	65
3.1.1.	Methods of relieving double taxation	66
3.2.	Residence state’s ability to fully relieve double taxation	67
3.2.1.	Assessing the extent of unrelieved double taxation in multilateral situations	68
3.2.2.	Factors relevant to both the credit and exemption methods	70
3.2.2.1.	Relative tax rates	71
3.2.2.2.	Relief in the PE state	72
3.2.3.	Additional factors relevant where the residence state uses the credit method	75

3.2.3.1.	Domestic credit limitations	75
3.2.3.2.	Ability to carry forward (or back) excess credits	78
3.2.3.3.	Impact of losses	79
3.2.4.	Conclusion	80
3.3.	Potential obligation to provide dual relief	81
3.3.1.	Dutch case law	82
3.3.2.	Relief provisions of the OECD Model	86
3.3.3.	Interaction between tax treaties	88
3.3.4.	Relief available under domestic law	93
3.3.4.1.	Situations where there is a domestic exemption	95
3.3.4.2.	Situations where domestic law provides for credit relief	96
3.3.4.3.	Conclusions	97
3.3.5.	Calculation of treaty credit relief by reference to domestic law	97
3.3.6.	Minimum requirement set by treaty relief measures	100
3.3.7.	Both treaties provide for the same method of relief	101
3.3.8.	Overview	102
3.3.9.	Potential solutions	103
3.4.	Conclusions	104
Chapter 4: The PE State and the Non-Discrimination Principle		107
4.1.	Introduction	107
4.2.	The need for relief in the PE state and potential sources of relief obligation	108
4.2.1.	The need for relief in the PE state	108
4.2.2.	Potential sources of relief obligation	110
4.2.2.1.	Domestic law	110
4.2.2.2.	European law	111
4.2.2.3.	The treaty between the PE state and the source state	112
4.2.2.4.	The treaty between the residence state and the PE state	112
4.3.	The PE non-discrimination principle and double taxation relief	113
4.3.1.	Introduction to article 24(3)	113
4.3.2.	Obligation to extend unilateral relief to PEs	114
4.3.3.	Obligation to extend treaty relief to PEs	116
4.3.3.1.	Preliminary analysis	116
4.3.3.2.	Comparison entity's eligibility for treaty benefits	117
4.3.3.3.	Arguments against extending treaty relief to PEs	120
4.3.3.4.	Conclusions	124

4.3.4.	Comparison entity's eligibility for treaty benefits in special circumstances	124
4.3.4.1.	Partnerships	124
4.3.4.2.	LOB provisions	126
4.3.5.	Amount of credit relief	132
4.3.5.1.	The first limitation: Tax imposed in the source state	132
4.3.5.2.	The second limitation: Tax that could be imposed in the source state if the PE-S treaty applied	135
4.3.5.3.	Inconsistency between the limitations	138
4.3.5.4.	Appropriate limitation to apply	138
4.3.6.	Relief in sub-PE triangular cases	139
4.3.7.	Comparison between article 24(3) and non-discrimination principles of EU law	140
4.4.	Conclusions	144
Chapter 5: Limitation of the Source State's Taxing Rights		145
5.1.	Introduction	145
5.2.	Whether source state taxation should be subject to the conditions of the PE-S treaty	146
5.2.1.	Potential impact of applying PE-S treaty conditions in the source state	146
5.2.2.	Why states agree to restrictions on their taxing rights under treaties	147
5.2.2.1.	To eliminate double taxation	147
5.2.2.2.	To allocate taxing jurisdiction	150
5.2.2.3.	To facilitate international trade and investment	153
5.2.2.4.	To prevent tax evasion	154
5.2.2.5.	The reciprocity principle	154
5.2.2.6.	Conclusions	156
5.2.3.	The role of the residence concept in tax treaties	156
5.2.3.1.	The residence concept in early treaties	158
5.2.3.2.	Reasons for confining treaty benefits to residents	165
5.2.3.3.	Difficulties in determining residence for treaty purposes	167
5.2.3.4.	Declining factual basis for corporate residence	169
5.2.3.5.	Source role of corporate taxation in an international context	171
5.2.3.6.	Conclusions	172
5.2.4.	The PE concept and the taxation of PEs	173
5.2.4.1.	The existence of a PE	173
5.2.4.2.	Taxation under domestic laws	177

5.2.4.3.	Quasi-resident status of PEs under tax treaties	178
5.2.4.4.	Importance of the differing legal nature of subsidiaries and PEs	181
5.2.4.5.	Whether the existing PE threshold is appropriate for treaty eligibility	185
5.2.4.6.	Conclusions	187
5.2.5.	Separate entity approach to attributing profit to PEs	188
5.2.5.1.	Historical development	189
5.2.5.2.	The AOA	192
5.2.5.3.	The AOA for financial institutions and financial assets	195
5.2.5.4.	Implications of the AOA	195
5.2.6.	Tax avoidance considerations	198
5.2.6.1.	Treaty shopping: The current landscape	199
5.2.6.2.	Potential for treaty shopping through PEs	207
5.2.7.	Impact of EU law	214
5.3.	Whether taxation in the source state should be subject to the conditions of the R-S treaty	216
5.3.1.	Potential impact of not applying R-S treaty conditions in the source state	217
5.3.2.	Conditions for availability of treaty benefits	218
5.3.3.	Whether source state taxation should be subject to multiple treaty restrictions	219
5.3.4.	Conclusions	219
5.4.	Conclusions	220
Chapter 6: Potential Solutions		225
6.1.	Introduction	225
6.1.1.	Overview of issues arising in PE triangular cases under the existing framework	225
6.1.1.1.	Unrelieved double taxation	225
6.1.1.2.	Applicable treaty conditions in the source state	228
6.1.1.3.	Potential dual relief obligation in the residence state	229
6.2.	Underlying issues and introduction to possible solutions	229
6.2.1.	Overlap between treaty source rules	229
6.2.2.	Hybrid nature of the PE concept	230
6.2.3.	Bilateral nature of tax treaties	232
6.3.	Treat PEs more like resident persons for treaty purposes	234

6.4.	Treat PE concept as a source concept and resolve overlap in sourcing rules	235
6.4.1.	Preventing taxation in the PE state	236
6.4.1.1.	Operation of provision preventing taxation in the PE state	237
6.4.1.2.	Assessment of this potential solution	239
6.4.2.	Preventing taxation in the source state	245
6.4.2.1.	Operation of provision preventing taxation in the source state	246
6.4.2.2.	Assessment of this potential solution	247
6.4.3.	Conclusions	249
6.5.	Multilateral treaties	250
6.5.1.	Existing multilateral treaties	250
6.5.1.1.	The Nordic Convention	251
6.5.1.2.	The CARICOM Convention	257
6.5.1.3.	The Andean Convention	260
6.5.1.4.	The EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive	262
6.5.2.	Possible multilateral treaty solutions	263
6.5.3.	Advantages of a multilateral treaty	265
6.5.4.	Practical limitations	266
6.6.	Conclusions	268
Chapter 7: Extending Treaty Benefits to PEs		271
7.1.	Introduction	271
7.2.	Overview of existing treaty provisions and proposals	274
7.2.1.	The Belgium-France Income Tax Treaty (1964)	274
7.2.2.	IFA Cahiers “The Taxation of Enterprises with Permanent Establishments Abroad” (1973)	275
7.2.3.	The France-Italy Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1989)	276
7.2.4.	The Ruding Report (1992)	277
7.2.5.	The OECD Triangular Cases Report (1992)	278
7.2.6.	Avery Jones’ proposal: Provisions included in all three treaties (1999)	279
7.2.7.	Zhai’s proposal: Indirect treaty entitlement for PEs (2009)	280
7.2.8.	Wheeler’s proposal: “The Missing Keystone of Income Tax Treaties” (2011)	281
7.2.9.	Instances where treaty benefits have been claimed on behalf of a PE	282
7.2.9.1.	<i>Commerzbank</i>	282

7.2.9.2.	<i>Crown Forest Industries</i>	283
7.2.10.	Conclusions	284
7.3.	Approaches to extending treaty benefits to PEs	285
7.3.1.	Direct treaty entitlement	288
7.3.2.	Indirect treaty entitlement	289
7.3.3.	Provisions included in all three treaties (Avery Jones' proposal)	291
7.3.4.	Mutual agreement	292
7.3.5.	Domestic law	293
7.3.6.	Conclusions	295
7.4.	Double taxation relief in the PE state	296
7.4.1.	Limitations on relief	296
7.4.1.1.	Basic criteria for relief	297
7.4.1.2.	Limitations on the amount of credit relief	297
7.4.2.	Provisions included in the R-PE treaty	299
7.4.2.1.	Method of relief	300
7.4.2.2.	Situations where there is no PE-S treaty	301
7.4.2.3.	Proposed relief provision	302
7.5.	Non-application of R-S treaty conditions in the source state	304
7.5.1.	Excluding the application of the R-S treaty in tax avoidance situations	305
7.5.1.1.	Specific provisions included in existing treaties	306
7.5.1.2.	Application of a specific anti-avoidance rule under domestic law	311
7.5.1.3.	Treat profit as not attributable to the PE	312
7.5.1.4.	Conclusions	313
7.5.2.	Excluding the R-S treaty where the PE-S treaty may apply in the source state	314
7.5.2.1.	Situations where there is no PE-S treaty or the PE-S treaty doesn't apply	314
7.5.2.2.	Proposed approach	315
7.5.3.	Relief in the residence state if source state doesn't apply R-S treaty	316
7.5.4.	Conclusions and proposed treaty provision	318
7.6.	Conclusions	322
Chapter 8: Provisions Extending Treaty Entitlement to PEs		325
8.1.	Introduction	325
8.2.	Provisions extending treaty benefits to PEs	325

Table of Contents

8.2.1.	Person claiming treaty benefits in relation to PE income	325
8.2.2.	Personal scope of treaties	327
8.2.3.	Applicable PE definition	328
8.2.4.	Income to which the PE-S treaty should apply	330
8.2.4.1.	Potential limitation to passive income	331
8.2.4.2.	Income which the PE state is prevented from taxing under the R-PE treaty	331
8.2.4.3.	Income which the PE state can tax otherwise than under article 7	333
8.2.5.	Proposed treaty provision extending treaty entitlement to PEs	333
8.3.	Prerequisites for availability of treaty benefits	335
8.3.1.	Residence	336
8.3.1.1.	Residence of the entity to which the PE belongs	336
8.3.1.2.	“Residence” at the level of the PE	336
8.3.2.	Beneficial ownership	338
8.3.2.1.	Beneficial ownership by the entity as a whole	338
8.3.2.2.	Beneficial ownership at the level of the PE	339
8.3.3.	Certification procedure	343
8.4.	Preventing improper access to treaties through PEs	345
8.4.1.	Examples of potential treaty shopping structures involving PEs	346
8.4.1.1.	Example 1: PE state doesn’t tax foreign income attributable to the PE	346
8.4.1.2.	Example 2: No tax on repatriations of income by the PE	350
8.4.1.3.	Example 3: Base erosion through notional payments	354
8.4.2.	Subject-to-tax provisions	359
8.4.3.	Denial of treaty benefits in base erosion situations	361
8.4.4.	Denial of treaty benefits where there is a tax avoidance motive	364
8.4.5.	LOB provisions	365
8.4.6.	Safe harbour provisions	368
8.4.7.	Conclusions	373
8.5.	Conclusions	374
Chapter 9: Further Issues Regarding Treaty Entitlement for PEs		377
9.1.	Introduction	377

9.2.	Special issues in applying the articles of the PE-S treaty	377
9.2.1.	Disagreements regarding the existence of a PE or attribution of income	378
9.2.1.1.	Bilateral mutual agreement procedure	378
9.2.1.2.	Dispute resolution in multilateral situations	381
9.2.2.	Application of thresholds contained in the PE-S treaty	384
9.2.3.	Attribution of investment income to insurance PEs	386
9.2.3.1.	Attribution of investment assets to insurance PEs	387
9.2.3.2.	Determining the investment income attributable to an insurance PE	388
9.2.3.3.	Implications for application of PE-S treaty to investment income of insurance PEs	389
9.2.4.	Income and capital gains arising from immovable property	390
9.2.5.	Sub-PE triangular cases	393
9.3.	Application of the R-PE treaty and recognition of notional dealings	394
9.3.1.	Application of the R-PE treaty to income derived from sources in the residence state	395
9.3.1.1.	Passive income	396
9.3.1.2.	Passive income where the residence state uses the credit method in relation to PE income	399
9.3.1.3.	Business profits and “other income”	402
9.3.1.4.	Income from immovable property	402
9.3.1.5.	Income from shipping, inland waterways transport and air transport	403
9.3.1.6.	Capital gains	403
9.3.1.7.	Conclusions	405
9.3.2.	Treatment of notional dealings	406
9.3.2.1.	Notional payments from the PE to the head office	407
9.3.2.2.	Notional payments between PEs located in different states	412
9.3.2.3.	Notional payments from the head office to the PE	415
9.3.2.4.	Notional profit distributions by the PE	415
9.3.2.5.	Conclusions	416
9.4.	Conclusions	416

Part III
Dual Resident Triangular Cases

Chapter 10: Dual Resident Triangular Cases	421
10.1. Introduction	421
10.2. Residence under domestic laws	423
10.2.1. Individual residence under domestic laws	424
10.2.2. Corporate residence under domestic laws	425
10.3. Residence under tax treaties	426
10.3.1. Residence tie-breaker rules for individuals	427
10.3.2. Residence tie-breaker rules for companies	430
10.3.2.1. Place of effective management	431
10.3.2.2. Alternative tie-breaker rules	432
10.4. Application of tax treaties in dual resident triangular cases	437
10.4.1. Situations where tie-breaker does not effectively allocate residence	438
10.4.1.1. Application of the treaty between the two residence states	439
10.4.1.2. Application of the treaties between the residence states and the source state	441
10.4.2. Situations where the tie-breaker effectively allocates residence to one state	442
10.4.2.1. Application of the treaty between the two residence states	443
10.4.2.2. Application of the treaties between the residence states and the source state	448
10.4.2.3. Potential for improper use of treaties	453
10.4.3. Situations where there is a PE in the losing residence state	455
10.4.3.1. Application of the treaty between the two residence states	456
10.4.3.2. Application of the treaties between the residence states and the source state	460
10.4.3.3. Potential double taxation where there is a PE in the losing residence state	465
10.4.4. Impact of retroactive determination of residence under tie-breaker rules	467
10.5. Conclusions	470

Chapter 11: Residence under Tax Treaties with Third States	471
11.1. Introduction	471
11.2. The second sentence of article 4(1)	473
11.2.1. Whether treaty limitations should be taken into account	474
11.2.2. Meaning of “liable to tax”	477
11.2.3. Source of income	479
11.2.3.1. Determining the source of income	480
11.2.3.2. Interpretation of the second sentence of article 4(1)	482
11.2.3.3. Conclusion	483
11.3. Preventing dual residents from claiming dual treaty benefits	484
11.3.1. Provisions included in domestic law	485
11.3.2. Provisions included in tax treaties	490
11.3.2.1. Alternative second sentence of article 4(1)	490
11.3.2.2. Provision referring directly to treaties with third states	491
11.3.3. Conclusions	493
11.4. Conclusions	493

Part IV
Reverse Triangular Cases

Chapter 12: Reverse Triangular Cases	499
12.1. Introduction	499
12.2. Reverse PE triangular cases	502
12.2.1. Dividends	503
12.2.1.1. Application of tax treaties under the existing treaty framework	504
12.2.1.2. Policy considerations	505
12.2.2. Interest and royalties	506
12.2.2.1. Application of article 11(5)	508
12.2.2.2. Potential solutions	511
12.2.2.3. Applicable PE definition for the purposes of article 11(5)	513
12.2.3. Other categories of income	515
12.2.4. Conclusions	520
12.3. Reverse dual resident triangular cases	521

Table of Contents

12.3.1.	Application of tax treaties under the existing treaty framework	522
12.3.2.	Situations where the tie-breaker rule does not effectively allocate residence	528
12.3.2.1.	Split the right to tax between the two residence states of the payor	530
12.3.2.2.	Allow tax in the state to which the payment is more closely connected	531
12.3.3.	Situations where the tie-breaker rule does effectively allocate residence of the payor	533
12.3.4.	Dividends and the application of article 10(5)	535
12.3.4.1.	Requirement for profits or income derived in the losing residence state	536
12.3.4.2.	Personal scope of the treaty	539
12.3.4.3.	Conclusions	542
12.3.5.	Potential solutions	542
12.3.5.1.	Domestic law	543
12.3.5.2.	Treaty provisions	543
12.3.5.3.	Conclusions	544
12.4.	Interaction between reverse dual resident and reverse PE triangular cases	544
12.4.1.	Dividends	545
12.4.2.	Interest	546
12.4.3.	Royalties	547
12.5.	Summary and conclusions	547
 Part V Conclusions 		
Chapter 13:	Conclusions	553
13.1.	Introduction	553
13.2.	PE triangular cases	553
13.2.1.	Extension of treaty benefits to PEs	554
13.2.1.1.	Approaches to extending treaty benefits to PEs	556
13.2.2.	Proposed treaty provisions	557
13.2.2.1.	Person claiming the benefit of the provision	558
13.2.2.2.	Income must be attributable to a PE for the purposes of the R-PE treaty	559
13.2.2.3.	No treaty benefits if PE state is prevented from imposing tax	559
13.2.2.4.	Residence and beneficial ownership	559

13.2.2.5.	Certification procedure	561
13.2.3.	Potential for improper access to treaties through PEs	561
13.2.3.1.	Specific provisions aimed at preventing improper access to treaties through PEs	562
13.2.4.	Excluding the operation of the R-S treaty	563
13.2.4.1.	Continued relief obligation in the residence state	566
13.2.5.	Conclusions	567
13.3.	Dual resident triangular cases	568
13.3.1.	Preventing application of treaties between the losing residence state and third states	570
13.3.2.	Interaction with extension of treaty benefits to PEs	571
13.4.	Reverse PE triangular cases	572
13.5.	Reverse dual resident triangular cases	574
13.6.	General conclusions	575
Appendix 1: Overview of Proposed Treaty Provisions		577
Appendix 2: Variations on the Basic Triangular Cases		587
Appendix 3: Summary		787
References		839