

PROBABILISTIC REASONING IN INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS:

Networks of Plausible Inference

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Contents

Chapter 1

UNCERTAINTY IN AI SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION*	1
1.1.1 Why Bother with Uncertainty?	1
1.1.2 Why Is It a Problem?	2
1.1.3 Approaches to Uncertainty	2
1.1.4 Extensional vs. Intensional Approaches	3
1.2 EXTENSIONAL SYSTEMS: MERITS, DEFICIENCIES, AND REMEDIES*	4
1.2.1 Computational Merits	4
1.2.2 Semantic Deficiencies	6
1.2.3 Attempted Remedies and their Limitations	9
1.3 INTENSIONAL SYSTEMS AND NETWORK REPRESENTATIONS*	12
1.3.1 Why Networks?	12
1.3.2 Graphoids and the Formalization of Relevance and Causality	13
1.4 THE CASE FOR PROBABILITIES*	14
1.4.1 Why Should Beliefs Combine Like Frequencies?	15
1.4.2 The Primitive Relationships of Probability Language	16
1.4.3 Probability as a Faithful Guardian of Common Sense	19

* Basic Issues

** Technical and Substantive Discussions

*** Advanced Research

For a detailed explanation of these levels, see Preface.

1.5	QUALITATIVE REASONING WITH PROBABILITIES*	23
1.5.1	Softened Logic vs. Hardened Probabilities	24
1.5.2	Probabilities and the Logic of "Almost True"	25
1.6	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	26
<i>Chapter 2</i>		
	BAYESIAN INFERENCE	29
2.1	BASIC CONCEPTS	29
2.1.1	Probabilistic Formulation and Bayesian Inversion*	29
2.1.2	Combining Predictive and Diagnostic Supports*	34
2.1.3	Pooling of Evidence*	36
2.1.4	Recursive Bayesian Updating*	37
2.1.5	Multi-Valued Hypotheses**	39
2.2	HIERARCHICAL MODELING	42
2.2.1	Uncertain Evidence (Cascaded Inference)*	42
2.2.2	Virtual (Intangible) Evidence*	44
2.2.3	Predicting Future Events**	47
2.2.4	Multiple Causes and "Explaining Away"*	49
2.2.5	Belief Networks and the Role of Causality*	50
2.3	EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES OF BELIEF UPDATING	52
2.3.1	Patterns of Plausible Inference: Polya vs. Bayes?*	52
2.3.2	The Three Prisoners Paradox: When the Bare Facts Won't Do*	58
2.3.3	Jeffrey's Rule and the Problem of Autonomous Inference Agents*	62
2.4	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	70
	EXERCISES	73
<i>Chapter 3</i>		
	MARKOV AND BAYESIAN NETWORKS: Two Graphical Representations of Probabilistic Knowledge	77
3.1	FROM NUMERICAL TO GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS	78
3.1.1	Introduction*	78

3.1.2	An Axiomatic Basis for Probabilistic Dependencies**	82
3.1.3	On Representing Dependencies by Undirected Graphs*	90
3.1.4	Axiomatic Characterization of Graph-Isomorph Dependencies***	93
3.2	MARKOV NETWORKS	96
3.2.1	Definitions and Formal Properties***	96
3.2.2	Illustrations**	100
3.2.3	Markov Network as a Knowledge Base***	104
3.2.4	Decomposable Models**	108
3.3	BAYESIAN NETWORKS	116
3.3.1	Dependence Semantics for Bayesian Networks**	117
3.3.2	Bayesian Network as a Knowledge Base**	122
3.3.3	How Expressive Are Bayesian Networks?***	126
3.4	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	131
	EXERCISES	134
	APPENDIX 3-A Proof of Theorem 3	139
	APPENDIX 3-B Proof of Theorem 4	141
<i>Chapter 4</i>		
	BELIEF UPDATING BY NETWORK PROPAGATION	143
4.1	AUTONOMOUS PROPAGATION AS A COMPUTATIONAL PARADIGM	144
4.1.1	Constraint Propagation and Rule-based Computation*	145
4.1.2	Why Probabilistic Reasoning Seems to Resist Propagation*	148
4.2	BELIEF PROPAGATION IN CAUSAL TREES	150
4.2.1	Notation**	150
4.2.2	Propagation in Chains**	153
4.2.3	Propagation in Trees**	162

4.3	BELIEF PROPAGATION IN CAUSAL POLYTREES (SINGLY CONNECTED NETWORKS)	175
4.3.1	Propagation Rules**	177
4.3.2	Canonical Models of Multicausal Interactions**	184
4.4	COPING WITH LOOPS	195
4.4.1	Clustering Methods*	197
4.4.2	The Method of Conditioning (Reasoning by Assumptions)*	204
4.4.3	Stochastic Simulation**	210
4.5	WHAT ELSE CAN BAYESIAN NETWORKS COMPUTE?	223
4.5.1	Answering Queries*	223
4.5.2	Introducing Constraints*	225
4.5.3	Answering Conjunctive Queries**	226
4.6	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	232
	EXERCISES	234
	APPENDIX 4-A Auxilliary Derivations for Section 4.5.3	236
 <i>Chapter 5</i>		
	DISTRIBUTED REVISION OF COMPOSITE BELIEFS	239
5.1	INTRODUCTION	239
5.2	ILLUSTRATING THE PROPAGATION SCHEME	241
5.2.1	Belief Updating (A Review)*	242
5.2.2	Belief Revision*	245
5.3	BELIEF REVISION IN SINGLY CONNECTED NETWORKS	250
5.3.1	Deriving the Propagation Rules***	251
5.3.2	Summary of Propagation Rules*	255
5.3.3	Reaching Equilibrium and Assembling a Composite Solution**	257
5.3.4	Comparison to Belief Updating*	259
5.3.5	Coping with Loops*	260

5.4	DIAGNOSIS OF SYSTEMS WITH MULTIPLE FAULTS	263
5.4.1	An Example: Electronic Circuit**	263
5.4.2	Initialization**	265
5.4.3	Fault Interpretation**	267
5.4.4	Finding the Second-Best Interpretation**	271
5.5	APPLICATION TO MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS	272
5.5.1	The Causal Model*	273
5.5.2	Message Propagation**	275
5.5.3	Choosing the Best Interpretation*	278
5.5.4	Generating Explanations*	279
5.5.5	Reversibility vs. Perseverance*	280
5.6	THE NATURE OF EXPLANATIONS	281
5.6.1	Accepting vs. Assessing Beliefs*	281
5.6.2	Is a Most-Probable Explanation Adequate?*	283
5.6.3	Circumscribing Explanations*	285
5.7	CONCLUSIONS	286
5.8	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	287
	EXERCISES	288
<i>Chapter 6</i>		
	DECISION AND CONTROL	289
6.1	FROM BELIEFS TO ACTIONS: INTRODUCTION TO DECISION ANALYSIS	289
6.1.1	Rational Decisions and Quality Guarantees*	289
6.1.2	Consequences, Payoffs, and Lotteries*	290
6.1.3	Calibrating the Value of a Lottery*	292
6.1.4	The Axioms of Utility Theory**	294
6.1.5	Utility Functions*	297
6.2	DECISION TREES AND INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS	299
6.2.1	Decision Trees*	299
6.2.2	Planning with Decision Trees*	300
6.2.3	Influence Diagrams*	306

6.3	THE VALUE OF INFORMATION	313
6.3.1	Information Sources and Their Values**	313
6.3.2	Myopic Assessments of Information Sources**	314
6.4	RELEVANCE-BASED CONTROL	318
6.4.1	Focusing Attention**	318
6.4.2	Utility-Free Assessment of Information Sources***	319
6.4.3	Controlling Attention*	324
6.4.4	Summary*	326
6.5	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	327
	EXERCISES	328
	<i>Chapter 7</i>	
	TAXONOMIC HIERARCHIES, CONTINUOUS VARIABLES, AND UNCERTAIN PROBABILITIES	333
7.1	EVIDENTIAL REASONING IN TAXONOMIC HIERARCHIES	333
7.1.1	Taxonomic vs. Causal Hierarchies*	333
7.1.2	Evidence Propagation in Taxonomic Hierarchies*	337
7.1.3	Probabilistic Justification**	340
7.1.4	Psychological and Computational Characteristics*	342
7.2	MANAGING CONTINUOUS VARIABLES	344
7.2.1	Plausible Reasoning about Uncertain Quantities*	344
7.2.2	Propagating Estimates and Ranges**	346
7.2.3	Qualitative Patterns of Reasoning**	351
7.2.4	Discussion*	355
7.3	REPRESENTING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PROBABILITIES	357
7.3.1	The Semantics of Probabilities of Probabilities*	358
7.3.2	De Finetti's Paradigm of Uncertain Contingencies*	359
7.3.3	A Formal Definition of Network-Induced Confidence Measures**	363

7.3.4	The Effect of Evidence on Confidence: An Example**	366
7.3.5	Conclusions*	372
7.4	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	372
	EXERCISES	374
	APPENDIX 7-A Derivation of Propagation Rules For Continuous Variables	375
 <i>Chapter 8</i>		
	LEARNING STRUCTURE FROM DATA	381
8.1	CAUSALITY, MODULARITY, AND TREE STRUCTURES*	383
8.2	STRUCTURING THE OBSERVABLES	387
8.2.1	Chow's Method of Constructing Trees**	387
8.2.2	Structuring Causal Polytrees**	390
8.2.3	Conclusions: Causation or Covariation?*	396
8.3	LEARNING HIDDEN CAUSES	398
8.3.1	Problem Definition and Nomenclature***	398
8.3.2	Star-Decomposable Triplets***	401
8.3.3	A Tree-Reconstruction Procedure***	402
8.3.4	Extensions to Normal Variables***	405
8.3.5	Conclusions and Open Questions*	407
8.4	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	408
	EXERCISES	409
	APPENDIX 8-A Proof of Theorems 1 and 2	411
	APPENDIX 8-B Conditions for Star-Decomposability (<i>After Lazarfeld [1966]</i>)	412
 <i>Chapter 9</i>		
	NON-BAYESIAN FORMALISMS FOR MANAGING UNCERTAINTY	415
9.1	THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY	416
9.1.1	Basic Concepts*	416

9.1.2	Comparing Bayesian and Dempster-Shafer Formalisms*	421
9.1.3	Dempster's Rule of Combination**	428
9.1.4	More on the Nature of Probability Intervals*	438
9.1.5	Applications to Rule-based Systems**	440
9.1.6	Bayes vs. Dempster-Shafer: A Semantic Clash*	447
9.2	TRUTH MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS	450
9.2.1	Naming the Assumptions*	451
9.2.2	Uncertainty Management in an ATMS**	454
9.2.3	Incidence Calculus*	456
9.3	PROBABILISTIC LOGIC**	457
9.4	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	462
	EXERCISES	465
<i>Chapter 10</i>		
	LOGIC AND PROBABILITY: THE STRANGE CONNECTION	467
10.1	INTRODUCTION TO NONMONOTONIC REASONING*	467
10.1.1	Reiter's Default Logic*	468
10.1.2	Problems with Default Logics*	470
10.1.3	Empirical vs. Procedural Semantics in Default Reasoning*	473
10.2	PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR DEFAULT REASONING	481
10.2.1	ϵ -semantics***	482
10.2.2	Axiomatic Characterization and a System of Defeasible Inference***	485
10.2.3	Relevance-based Conventions***	491
10.2.4	Do People Use the Logic of Extreme Probabilities?*	493

10.3	EMBRACING CAUSALITY IN DEFAULT REASONING	497
10.3.1	How Old Beliefs Were Established Determines Which New Beliefs Are Evoked*	497
10.3.2	More on the Distinction Between Causal and Evidential Support*	499
10.3.3	The C-E System: A Coarse Logical Abstraction of Causal Directionality*	501
10.3.4	Implicit Suppressors and the Need for Finer Abstractions*	507
10.4	A PROBABILISTIC TREATMENT OF THE YALE SHOOTING PROBLEM	509
10.4.1	The Problem and its Solution*	509
10.4.2	Concluding Dialogue*	513
10.5	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REMARKS	516
	EXERCISES	518
	Bibliography	521
	Author Index	539
	Subject Index	545